Algebraic inquisitive semantics *

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Abstract. This paper develops an algebraically motivated inquisitive semantics. We argue that propositions, in order to embody both informative and inquisitive content in a satisfactory way, should be defined as non-empty, downward closed sets of possibilities, where each possibility in turn is a set of possible worlds. We define a natural entailment order over such propositions, capturing when one proposition is at least as informative and inquisitive as another, and we show that this entailment order gives rise to a complete Heyting algebra, with meet, join, and relative pseudo-complement operators. Just as in classical logic, these semantic operators are then associated with the logical constants in a first-order language. We explore the logical properties of the resulting system and discuss its significance for natural language semantics. We show that the system essentially coincides with the inquisitive semantics developed and investigated in (Groenendijk, 2008; Ciardelli, 2009; Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009; Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011), whose treatment of the logical constants was so far mainly justified by linguistic intuitions. Thus, our algebraic considerations do not lead to a wholly new semantics, but rather provide a more solid foundation for an existing system.

Keywords: inquisitive semantics, algebraic semantics, information exchange

1. Introduction

The central aim of inquisitive semantics¹ is to develop a notion of semantic meaning that embodies both informative and inquisitive content. One way to achieve this is to define the proposition expressed by a sentence \( \varphi \), \([\varphi]\), as a set of possibilities, where each possibility in turn is a set of possible worlds. In uttering \( \varphi \), a speaker can then be taken to

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¹ Some key references are (Groenendijk, 2009; Mascarenhas, 2009; Ciardelli, 2009; Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009; Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011). For further references and developments we refer to www.illc.uva.nl/inquisitive-semantics.
provide the information that the actual world is located in at least one of the possibilities in $[\varphi]$, i.e., in $\bigcup[\varphi]$, and at the same time she can be taken to request information from other participants in order to locate the actual world more precisely inside a specific possibility in $[\varphi]$.

For instance, if $[\varphi] = \{\{w_1, w_2\}, \{w_1, w_3\}\}$, as depicted on the right, then in uttering $\varphi$, a speaker can be taken to provide the information that the actual world lies in $\bigcup[\varphi] = \{w_1, w_2, w_3\}$, and at the same time she can be taken to request enough information to establish that the actual world lies in $\{w_1, w_2\}$ or to establish that it lies in $\{w_1, w_3\}$. In this way, $[\varphi]$ captures both the informative and the inquisitive content of $\varphi$.

As soon as the basic notion of meaning is enriched in this way, two crucial questions arise. The first question is whether it is really necessary to define propositions as arbitrary sets of possibilities, or whether we can, and perhaps even should, adopt a more constrained notion of propositions. Ideally, our notion of propositions should be just right for the purpose at hand, which is to capture informative and inquisitive content. In particular, we would like that any two non-identical propositions really differ in informative and/or inquisitive content. Otherwise, we would have two representations for exactly the same content. We will show that, in order to meet this criterion, propositions cannot be defined as arbitrary sets of possibilities. Instead, we will define them as non-empty, downward closed sets of possibilities (i.e., if $\alpha \in [\varphi]$ and $\beta \subseteq \alpha$, then $\beta \in [\varphi]$ as well) and we will argue that this indeed constitutes a natural notion of propositions, which meets the above criterion.

The second question that arises is how the propositions expressed by complex sentences should be defined in a compositional way. In particular, if we limit ourselves to a first-order language, what is the role of connectives and quantifiers in this richer setting? How do we define $[\neg \varphi]$, $[\varphi \land \psi]$, $[\varphi \lor \psi]$, etcetera, in terms of $[\varphi]$ and $[\psi]$?

This issue has of course been addressed in previous work (see the references in footnote 1). However, the clauses for connectives and quantifiers that have been proposed so far were mainly justified by linguistic intuitions. For instance, the clause for $\lor$ was mainly justified by intuitions concerning the word or in English. The vantage point of this way of justifying the clauses is that it provides a very direct link between the treatment of the logical constants in the system and intuitions about the natural language expressions that these logical constants are usually associated with. Thereby, it immediately brings out the significance of the system for natural language semantics. However, the approach also has two important drawbacks.
First, it gives the impression that inquisitive semantics primarily constitutes a particular theory about the semantic behavior of connectives and quantifiers in natural language. This is indeed how it is often perceived. It is taken to make certain predictions about constructions in natural language, and it is evaluated based on these predictions. This perception is understandable, given the way the semantics has been presented so far. However, we see inquisitive semantics primarily as a semantic framework in which many different theories could in principle be formulated and compared. Just like classical logic, it does not directly provide a theory of the meaning of certain constructions in natural language, but rather the logical and conceptual infrastructure that is needed to formulate such theories.

Second, even if the treatment of the logical constants in previous work on inquisitive semantics is regarded as a theory of natural language connectives and quantifiers, and even if its predictions are found to be correct, it can at best be seen as a precise description of the facts. In order for it to be explanatory, it should be explicitly justified by considerations independent of the linguistic data themselves.

In order to overcome these two drawbacks, the present paper develops an algebraically motivated inquisitive semantics. Just like classical propositions can be shown to form a complete Boolean algebra, and classical logic can be obtained by associating the basic operations in this algebra with the logical constants, we will show that inquisitive propositions form a complete Heyting algebra, and we will obtain an inquisitive semantics for the language of first-order logic by associating the basic operations in this algebra with the logical constants. Crucially, the motivation for the resulting semantics does not rely on intuitions concerning specific linguistic constructions.

Of course, we do expect that natural languages generally have constructions that are used to perform basic algebraic operations on propositions. For instance, it would be natural to expect that languages generally have a word that is used (possibly among other things) to construct the join of two propositions, and another word to construct the meet of two propositions. In English, the words or and and are usually taken to fulfill this purpose. If this general expectation is borne out, inquisitive semantics does not only make it possible to give a precise description of the meaning of these words; crucially, its algebraic foundations also provide an explanation for the ubiquity of words with these particular meanings across languages.

We will show that our algebraic semantics will essentially coincide with the most basic system proposed in earlier work. Thus, our algebraic considerations will indeed converge with the linguistic intuitions that previously played a central role in justifying the treatment of the
logical constants, and the main result of our work will not be a new semantics, but rather a more solid foundation for an existing system.

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the algebraic foundations of classical logic; section 3 develops an algebraically motivated inquisitive semantics, discussing its logical properties and significance for natural language semantics; and section 4 concludes.

2. Algebraic foundations of classical logic

To illustrate our approach, let us briefly review the algebraic foundations of classical logic. Throughout the paper we will assume a set $W$ of possible worlds as our logical space. In classical logic, the proposition expressed by a sentence $\varphi$ is a set of possible worlds $[\varphi]_c \subseteq W$, embodying the informative content of the sentence. In asserting $\varphi$, a speaker is taken to provide the information that the actual world is located in $[\varphi]_c$. Given this way of thinking about propositions, there is a natural entailment order between them: $A \models_c B$ iff $A$ is at least as informative as $B$, i.e., iff $A \subseteq B$.

This entailment order in turn gives rise to certain algebraic operations on propositions. For instance, for any set of propositions $\Sigma$, there is a unique proposition that (i) entails all the propositions in $\Sigma$, and (ii) is entailed by all other propositions that entail all propositions in $\Sigma$. This proposition is called the greatest lower bound of $\Sigma$ w.r.t. $\models_c$, or in algebraic jargon, its meet. It amounts to $\bigcap \Sigma$ (given the stipulation that $\bigcap \emptyset = W$). Similarly, every set of propositions $\Sigma$ also has a unique least upper bound w.r.t. $\models_c$, which is called its join, and amounts to $\bigcup \Sigma$. The existence of meets and joins for arbitrary sets of classical propositions implies that the set of all classical propositions, $\Pi_c$, together with the entailment order $\models_c$, forms a complete lattice.

This lattice is bounded. That is, it has a bottom element, $\bot := \emptyset$, and a top element, $\top := W$. Moreover, for every two propositions $A$ and $B$, there is a unique weakest proposition $C$ such that $A \cap C \models_c B$. This proposition is called the pseudo-complement of $A$ relative to $B$. It is denoted as $A \Rightarrow B$ and amounts to $(W - A) \cup B$. Intuitively, the pseudo-complement of $A$ relative to $B$ is the weakest proposition such that if we ‘add’ $A$ to it, we get a proposition that is at least as strong as $B$. The existence of relative pseudo-complements implies that $\langle \Pi_c, \models_c \rangle$ forms a Heyting algebra.

If $A$ is an element of a Heyting algebra, it is customary to refer to $A^* := (A \Rightarrow \bot)$ simply as the pseudo-complement of $A$. In the case of $\langle \Pi_c, \models_c \rangle$, $A^*$ amounts to $W - A$. By definition, we always have that $A \cap A^* = \bot$. In the specific case of $\langle \Pi_c, \models_c \rangle$, we also always have that
$A \cup A^* = \top$. This means that $A^*$ is in fact the Boolean complement of $A$, and that $\langle \Pi_c, \models_c \rangle$ forms a Boolean algebra, a special kind of Heyting algebra.

Now, classical propositional logic is obtained by associating the basic algebraic operators, meet, join, and (relative) pseudo-complementation with the logical constants:

1. $[\neg \varphi] := [\varphi]^*$
2. $[\varphi \land \psi] := [\varphi] \cap [\psi]$
3. $[\varphi \lor \psi] := [\varphi] \cup [\psi]$
4. $[\varphi \rightarrow \psi] := [\varphi] \Rightarrow [\psi]$

Notice that everything starts with a certain notion of propositions and a natural entailment order on these propositions. This entailment order, then, gives rise to certain basic operations on propositions—meet, join, and relative pseudo-complementation—and classical propositional logic is obtained by associating these basic semantic operations with the logical constants.

### 3. Algebraic inquisitive semantics

Exactly the same strategy can be applied in the inquisitive setting. Only now we will have a richer notion of propositions, and a different entailment order on them: propositions are not only ordered in terms of their informative content, but also in terms of their inquisitive content.

#### 3.1. Propositions and entailment

Let us first determine how propositions and entailment should be defined precisely. We will start with the following notion of propositions; this will be refined below, but it forms a natural point of departure.

**Definition 1** (Possibilities and propositions).

- A set of possible worlds $\alpha \subseteq W$ is called a possibility.
- A proposition is a non-empty set of possibilities. (to be refined)

Propositions of this kind can be taken to embody informative and inquisitive content in the following way. First, in uttering a sentence that expresses a proposition $A$, a speaker is taken to provide the information that the actual world lies in at least one of the possibilities in $A$, i.e. in $\bigcup A$. We will refer to $\bigcup A$ as the informative content of $A$, and denote it as $\text{info}(A)$. 
Definition 2 (Informative content). \( \text{info}(A) := \bigcup A \)

On the other hand, someone who utters a sentence that expresses a proposition \( A \) also requests certain information from other conversational participants. Namely, she requests enough information to locate the actual world in a specific possibility in \( A \), rather than just in the union of all the possibilities that \( A \) consists of. A piece of information, modeled as a set of possible worlds, settles \( A \) just in case it is contained in one of the possibilities \( \alpha \in A \), which means that it locates the actual world inside that possibility \( \alpha \).

Definition 3 (Settling a proposition).
A piece of information \( \beta \) settles a proposition \( A \) if and only if \( \beta \subseteq \alpha \) for some \( \alpha \in A \).

Notice that propositions are defined as non-empty sets of possibilities. This reflects the assumption that for any proposition, there is at least one piece of information that settles that proposition (although there is one proposition, namely \( \{\emptyset\} \), which can only be settled by providing inconsistent information).

Propositions can be ordered in terms of the information that they provide, but also in terms of the information that they request. Just as in the classical setting, we say that one proposition \( A \) is at least as informative as another proposition \( B \), \( A \models \text{info} B \), just in case \( \text{info}(A) \subseteq \text{info}(B) \). On the other hand, we say that one proposition is at least as inquisitive as another proposition \( B \), \( A \models \text{inq} B \), iff \( A \) requests at least as much information as \( B \), i.e., iff every piece of information that settles \( A \) also settles \( B \). This means that every possibility in \( A \) must be contained in some possibility in \( B \). Thus, \( A \models \text{inq} B \) if and only if \( \forall \alpha \in A \exists \beta \in B \alpha \subseteq \beta \). These two orders can be combined into one overall entailment order: \( A \models B \) iff both \( A \models \text{info} B \) and \( A \models \text{inq} B \).

Definition 4 (Entailment).

- \( A \models \text{info} B \) iff \( \text{info}(A) \subseteq \text{info}(B) \)
- \( A \models \text{inq} B \) iff \( \forall \alpha \in A \exists \beta \in B \alpha \subseteq \beta \)
- \( A \models B \) iff \( A \models \text{info} B \) and \( A \models \text{inq} B \)

Notice that \( A \models \text{inq} B \) actually implies that \( A \models \text{info} B \). After all, if every possibility in \( A \) is contained in some possibility in \( B \), then \( \bigcup A \) must also be contained in \( \bigcup B \). Thus, the overall entailment order can be simplified as follows.

Fact 1 (Entailment simplified). \( A \models B \) iff \( \forall \alpha \in A \exists \beta \in B \alpha \subseteq \beta \)
Having established this notion of entailment, we are ready to examine whether our notion of propositions is really appropriate for the purpose at hand. As mentioned in the introduction, we would like to have that any two non-identical propositions really differ in informative and/or inquisitive content. Or, phrased the other way around, any two propositions \( A \) and \( B \) that are just as informative and just as inquisitive, should be identical. In more technical terms, we want our entailment order to be \textit{anti-symmetric}. That is, whenever \( A \models B \) and \( B \models A \), it should be the case that \( A = B \). We will show that this is \textit{not} the case.

Consider the two propositions in figure 1: the proposition on the left, \( A \), consists of two possibilities, \( \alpha \) and \( \beta \), while the proposition on the right, \( B \), consists of three possibilities, \( \alpha \), \( \beta \), and \( \gamma \). Thus, these two propositions are not identical. However, they are just as informative and just as inquisitive: \( A \models B \) and \( B \models A \).

To see this, first notice that \( \text{info}(A) \) and \( \text{info}(B) \), i.e., the union of the possibilities in \( A \) and the union of the possibilities in \( B \), clearly coincide. Thus, \( A \) and \( B \) are just as informative. To see that \( A \) and \( B \) also request just as much information, consider a piece of information that settles \( A \). Such a piece of information must either provide the information that the actual world lies in \( \alpha \) or it must provide the information that the actual world lies in \( \beta \). But that means that it also settles \( B \). And vice versa, any piece of information that settles \( B \) also settles \( A \). Thus, \( A \) and \( B \) are also just as inquisitive.

This shows that, as long as we are interested in capturing only informative and inquisitive content, our notion of propositions as arbitrary sets of possibilities is not quite appropriate. Rather, we would like to have a more restricted notion of propositions, such that any two non-identical propositions really differ in informative and/or inquisitive content.\(^2\)

\(^2\) There is a large body of linguistic work on the semantics of questions, starting with Hamblin (1973) and Karttunen (1977), which assumes precisely the type of
To this end, we will define propositions as non-empty, *downward closed* sets of possibilities.

**Definition 5** (Propositions as downward closed sets of possibilities).

- A set of possibilities $A$ is downward closed if and only if for every $\alpha \in A$ and every $\beta \subseteq \alpha$, we also have that $\beta \in A$.

- Propositions are non-empty, downward closed sets of possibilities.

We will use $\Pi$ to denote the set of all propositions. To see that downward closedness is a natural constraint on propositions in the present setting, consider the following. We are conceiving of propositions as sets of possibilities, and these possibilities determine what it takes to settle a given proposition. Thus far, we have been assuming the following relationship between the pieces of information that settle a proposition $A$ and the possibilities that $A$ consists of: a piece of information $\beta$ settles $A$ iff it is contained in some possibility $\alpha \in A$. But we could just as well assume a more direct relationship between the possibilities in $A$ and the pieces of information that settle $A$. Namely, we could simply think of the possibilities in $A$ as corresponding precisely to the pieces of information that settle $A$. But if we conceive of the possibilities in a proposition in this way, we are immediately forced to define propositions as downward closed sets of possibilities. After all, if $\alpha \in A$, then, given the assumed conception of possibilities, $\alpha$ is a piece of information that settles $A$; but then any stronger piece of information $\beta \subset \alpha$ also settles $A$, and this means, again given the assumed conception of possibilities, that any $\beta \subset \alpha$ must also be in $A$.

Given this more restricted notion of propositions as non-empty, downward closed sets of possibilities, the characterization of $\models$ can be further simplified. We said above that $A \models B$ iff every piece of information that settles $A$ also settles $B$. Given our new conception of propositions, this simply amounts to inclusion: $A \subseteq B$.

**Fact 2** (Entailment further simplified). $A \models B$ iff $A \subseteq B$

From this characterization it immediately follows that $\models$ forms a partial order over $\Pi$. This implies in particular that $\models$ is anti-symmetric, meanings that we have considered here, i.e., meanings as arbitrary sets of possibilities. All this work suffers from the anti-symmetry problem that we just pointed out. There is also a large body of work, starting with Groenendijk and Stokhof (1984), in which question-meanings are not taken to be arbitrary sets of possibilities, but rather sets of possibilities that *partition* the logical space. In this case the anti-symmetry problem does not arise. For arguments to move from a partition semantics to an inquisitive semantics of the kind developed here, we refer to Mascarenhas (2009).
which means that every two non-identical propositions really differ in informative and/or inquisitive content, as desired.

3.2. **Algebraic operations**

The next step is to see what kind of algebraic operations $\models$ gives rise to. It turns out that, just as in the classical setting, any set of propositions $\Sigma$ has a unique greatest lower bound (meet) and a unique least upper bound (join) w.r.t. $\models$.

**Fact 3** (Meet).
For any set of propositions $\Sigma$, $\bigcap \Sigma$ is the meet of $\Sigma$ w.r.t. $\models$ (assuming that $\bigcap \emptyset = \wp(W)$).

*Proof.* First, let us show that $\bigcap \Sigma$ is a proposition. If $\Sigma = \emptyset$ then $\bigcap \Sigma = \wp(W)$, which is indeed a proposition. If $\Sigma \neq \emptyset$ then $\bigcap \Sigma$ must contain $\emptyset$, since all elements of $\Sigma$ are non-empty and downward closed, which means that they must contain $\emptyset$. So $\bigcap \Sigma$ is non-empty. To see that it is also downward closed, suppose that $\alpha \in \bigcap \Sigma$. Then $\alpha$ must be in every proposition in $\Sigma$. But then every $\beta \subseteq \alpha$ must also be included in every proposition in $\Sigma$, and therefore in $\bigcap \Sigma$. So $\bigcap \Sigma$ is indeed downward closed. Next, note that $\bigcap \Sigma \models A$ for any $A \in \Sigma$, which means that $\bigcap \Sigma$ is a lower bound of $\Sigma$. What remains to be shown is that $\bigcap \Sigma$ is the greatest lower bound of $\Sigma$. That is, for every $B$ that is a lower bound of $\Sigma$, we must show that $B \models \bigcap \Sigma$. To see this let $B$ be a lower bound of $\Sigma$, and let $\beta$ be a possibility in $B$. Then, since $B \models A$ for any $A \in \Sigma$, $\beta$ must be included in any $A \in \Sigma$. But then $\beta$ must also be in $\bigcap \Sigma$. Thus, $B \models \bigcap \Sigma$, which is exactly what we set out to show. So $\bigcap \Sigma$ is indeed the greatest lower bound of $\Sigma$. □

**Fact 4** (Join).
For any set of propositions $\Sigma$, $\bigcup \Sigma$ is the join of $\Sigma$ w.r.t. $\models$ (assuming that $\bigcup \emptyset = \{\emptyset\}$).

*Proof.* We omit the proof that $\bigcup \Sigma$ is a proposition. For any $A \in \Sigma$, $A \models \bigcup \Sigma$, which means that $\bigcup \Sigma$ is an upper bound of $\Sigma$. What remains to be shown is that $\bigcup \Sigma$ is the least upper bound of $\Sigma$. That is, for every $B$ that is an upper bound of $\Sigma$, we must show that $\bigcup \Sigma \models B$. To see this let $B$ be an upper bound of $\Sigma$, and $\alpha$ a possibility in $\bigcup \Sigma$. Then $\alpha$ must be in some proposition $A \in \Sigma$. But then, since $A \models B$, $\alpha$ must also be in $B$. And this establishes that $\bigcup \Sigma \models B$, which is what we set out to show. Thus, $\bigcup \Sigma$ is indeed the least upper bound of $\Sigma$. □

The existence of meets and joins for arbitrary sets of propositions implies that $\langle \Pi, \models \rangle$ forms a complete lattice. And again, this lattice
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is bounded, i.e., there is a bottom element, \( \bot := \{\emptyset\} \), and a top element, \( \top := \wp(W) \). Finally, as in the classical setting, for every two propositions \( A \) and \( B \), there is a unique weakest proposition \( C \) such that \( A \cap C \models B \). Recall that this proposition, which is called the pseudo-complement of \( A \) relative to \( B \), can be characterized intuitively as the weakest proposition such that if we add \( A \) to it, we get a proposition that is at least as strong as \( B \). The only thing that has changed with respect to the classical setting is that strength is now measured both in terms of informative content and in terms of inquisitive content.

**Definition 6.** For any two propositions \( A \) and \( B \):

\[
A \Rightarrow B := \{\alpha \mid \text{for every } \beta \subseteq \alpha, \text{if } \beta \in A \text{ then } \beta \in B\}
\]

**Fact 5 (Relative pseudo-complement).**

For any two propositions \( A \) and \( B \), \( A \Rightarrow B \) is the pseudo-complement of \( A \) relative to \( B \).

**Proof.** We omit the proof that \( A \Rightarrow B \) is a proposition. To see that \( A \cap (A \Rightarrow B) \models B \), let \( \alpha \) be a possibility in \( A \cap (A \Rightarrow B) \). Then \( \alpha \) is both in \( A \) and in \( A \Rightarrow B \). Since \( \alpha \in A \Rightarrow B \), it must be the case that if \( \alpha \in A \) then also \( \alpha \in B \). But we know that \( \alpha \in A \). So \( \alpha \) must also be in \( B \). This establishes that \( A \cap (A \Rightarrow B) \models B \).

It remains to be shown that \( A \Rightarrow B \) is the weakest proposition \( C \) such that \( A \cap C \models B \). In other words, we must show that for any proposition \( C \) such that \( A \cap C \models B \), it holds that \( C \models (A \Rightarrow B) \). To see this, let \( C \) be a proposition such that \( A \cap C \models B \) and let \( \alpha \) be a possibility in \( C \). Towards a contradiction, suppose that \( \alpha \notin (A \Rightarrow B) \). Then there must be some \( \beta \subseteq \alpha \) such that \( \beta \in A \) and \( \beta \notin B \). Since \( C \) is downward closed, \( \beta \in C \). But that means that \( \beta \) is in \( A \cap C \), while \( \beta \notin B \). Thus \( A \cap C \not\models B \), contrary to what we assumed. So \( A \Rightarrow B \) is indeed the pseudo-complement of \( A \) relative to \( B \).

The existence of relative pseudo-complements implies that \( \langle \Pi, \models \rangle \) forms a Heyting algebra. Recall that in a Heyting algebra, \( A^* := (A \Rightarrow \bot) \) is referred to as the pseudo-complement of \( A \). In the specific case of \( \langle \Pi, \models \rangle \), pseudo-complements can be characterized as follows.

**Fact 6 (Pseudo-complement).** For any proposition \( A \):

\[
A^* = \{\beta \mid \beta \cap \bigcup A = \emptyset\}
\]

Thus, \( A^* \) consists of all the possibilities that are disjoint from \( \bigcup A \). This means that a piece of information settles \( A^* \) just in case it locates the actual world outside \( \bigcup A \).
So far, then, everything works out just as in the classical setting. However, unlike in the classical setting, the pseudo-complement of a proposition is not always its Boolean complement. In fact, most propositions in \( \langle \Pi, \models \rangle \) do not have a Boolean complement at all. To see this, suppose that \( A \) and \( B \) are Boolean complements. This means that (i) \( A \cap B = \bot \) and (ii) \( A \cup B = \top \). Condition (ii) can only be fulfilled if \( W \) is contained in either \( A \) or \( B \). Suppose \( W \in A \). Then, since \( A \) is downward closed, \( A = \varphi(W) = \top \). But then, in order to satisfy condition (i), we must have that \( B = \{ \emptyset \} = \bot \). So the only two elements of our algebra that have a Boolean complement are \( \top \) and \( \bot \). This implies that \( \langle \Pi, \models \rangle \) does not form a Boolean algebra.

Thus, starting with a new notion of propositions and an entailment order on these propositions that takes both informative and inquisitive content into account, we have established an algebraic structure with three basic operations, meet, join, and relative pseudo-complementation. The only difference with the algebraic structure obtained in the classical setting is that, apart from the extremal elements of the algebra, propositions do not have Boolean complements. However, as in the classical setting, every proposition does have a pseudo-complement.

3.3. CONNECTIVES

Now suppose that we have a language \( L \), whose sentences express the kind of propositions considered here. Then it is natural to assume that this language has certain sentential connectives which semantically behave like meet, join or (relative) pseudo-complement operators.

Below we define a semantics for the language of propositional logic, \( L_P \), that has exactly these characteristics: conjunction behaves semantically as a meet operator, disjunction behaves as a join operator, negation as a pseudo-complement operator, and implication as a relative pseudo-complementation operator. The semantics assumes a valuation function which assigns a truth-value to every atomic sentence in every world. For any atomic sentence \( p \), the set of worlds where \( p \) is true is denoted by \( |p| \).

**Definition 7** (Algebraic inquisitive semantics for \( L_P \)).

1. \([p] := \varphi(|p|)\)
2. \(\lnot \varphi := [\varphi]^*\)
3. \([\varphi \land \psi] := [\varphi] \cap [\psi]\)
4. \([\varphi \lor \psi] := [\varphi] \cup [\psi]\)
5. \([\varphi \rightarrow \psi] := [\varphi] \Rightarrow [\psi]\)
Natural languages are of course much more intricate than the language of propositional logic. We expect, however, that natural languages will generally also have connectives which behave semantically as meet, join, and (relative) pseudo-complement operators.

3.4. QUANTIFIERS

The approach taken here can straightforwardly be extended to obtain an inquisitive semantics for the language of first-order logic, $L_{FO}$. The proposition expressed by a universally quantified formula $\forall x. \varphi$, relative to an assignment $g$, can be defined as the meet of all the propositions that $\varphi$ expresses relative to assignment functions that differ from $g$ at most in the value that they assign to $x$. And similarly, the proposition expressed by an existentially quantified formula $\exists x. \varphi$, relative to $g$, can be defined as the join of all the propositions that $\varphi$ expresses relative to assignment functions that differ from $g$ at most in the value that they assign to $x$.

As usual, the semantics for $L_{FO}$ assumes a domain of individuals $D$ and a world-dependent interpretation function $I_w$ that maps every individual constant $c$ to some individual in $D$ and every $n$-place predicate symbol $R$ to a set of $n$-tuples of individuals in $D$. Formulas are interpreted relative to an assignment function $g$, which maps every variable $x$ to some individual in $D$. For every individual constant $c$, $[c]_{w,g} = I_w(c)$ and for every variable $x$, $[x]_{w,g} = g(x)$. An atomic sentence $Rt_1 \ldots t_n$ is true in a world $w$ relative to an assignment function $g$ iff $([t_1]_{w,g}, \ldots, [t_n]_{w,g}) \in I_w(R)$. Given an assignment function $g$, the set of all worlds $w$ such that $Rt_1 \ldots t_n$ is true in $w$ relative to $g$ is denoted by $|Rt_1 \ldots t_n|_g$.

**Definition 8** (Algebraic inquisitive semantics for $L_{FO}$).

1. $[Rt_1 \ldots t_n]_g := \varphi([Rt_1 \ldots t_n]_g)$
2. $[\neg \varphi]_g := [\varphi]^*_g$
3. $[\varphi \land \psi]_g := [\varphi]_g \cap [\psi]_g$
4. $[\varphi \lor \psi]_g := [\varphi]_g \cup [\psi]_g$
5. $[\varphi \rightarrow \psi]_g := [\varphi]_g \Rightarrow [\psi]_g$
6. $[\forall x. \varphi]_g := \bigcap_{d \in D} [\varphi]_g[x/d]$
7. $[\exists x. \varphi]_g := \bigcup_{d \in D} [\varphi]_g[x/d]$
We will refer to this system as \( \text{Inq}_A \), where \( A \) stands for algebraic. In the remainder of the paper we will relate \( \text{Inq}_A \) to earlier work on inquisitive semantics, identify its basic logical properties, and discuss its significance for natural language semantics.

3.5. **Propositions and Support**

In most previous work on inquisitive semantics, the proposition expressed by a sentence is not determined by a direct recursive definition. Rather, it is defined in terms of the notion of support (just as in the classical setting, the proposition expressed by a sentence is usually defined in terms of truth). Support is a relation between sentences and information states (relativized to an assignment function in the first-order setting). Information states are modeled as sets of possible worlds (valuation functions in the propositional setting; first-order models in the first-order setting). Support for \( L_{FO} \) is defined recursively as follows.\(^3\)

**Definition 9** (First-order support).

1. \( s \models_g R t_1 \ldots t_n \) iff \( s \subseteq |R t_1 \ldots t_n|_g \)
2. \( s \models_g \neg \varphi \) iff \( \forall t \subseteq s : t \not\models_g \varphi \)
3. \( s \models_g \varphi \land \psi \) iff \( s \models_g \varphi \) and \( s \models \psi \)
4. \( s \models_g \varphi \lor \psi \) iff \( s \models \varphi \) or \( s \models \psi \)
5. \( s \models_g \varphi \rightarrow \psi \) iff \( \forall t \subseteq s : \text{if } t \models \varphi \text{ then } t \models \psi \)
6. \( s \models_g \forall x. \varphi \) iff \( s \models_{[x/d]} \varphi \) for every \( d \in D \)
7. \( s \models_g \exists x. \varphi \) iff \( s \models_{[x/d]} \varphi \) for some \( d \in D \)

Now, it turns out that there is a very close connection between the information states that support a formula \( \varphi \), relative to an assignment \( g \), and the proposition \([\varphi]_g\) that \( \varphi \) expresses relative to \( g \) in \( \text{Inq}_A \). Namely, the proposition expressed by \( \varphi \) relative to \( g \) in \( \text{Inq}_A \) is precisely the set of all states that support \( \varphi \) relative to \( g \).

---

\(^3\) The definition of support assumed here was first proposed for \( L_P \) in (Groenendijk, 2008; Ciardelli, 2008). It was extended to \( L_{FO} \) in (Ciardelli, 2009) and further investigated in (Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009; Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011). The definition differs subtly but crucially from the one proposed in (Groenendijk, 2009; Mascarenhas, 2009). For discussion of the differences and arguments in favor of the current notion of support, see (Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011, §8).
**Fact 7** (Propositions and support).

For any formula $\varphi \in L_{FO}$, state $s$, and assignment $g$:

$$s \models^g \varphi \iff s \in [\varphi]_g$$

This result tells us that $\text{Inq}_A$ essentially coincides with the existing support-based system. It must be noted that in most presentations of the support-based system, the proposition expressed by a sentence is defined as the set of *maximal* states supporting the sentence, rather than the set of *all* supporting states.\(^4\) However, central logical notions like entailment and equivalence are directly defined in terms of support, which means that the logic that the two systems give rise to is exactly the same. Thus, all the logical results obtained for the support-based system immediately carry over to $\text{Inq}_A$. In particular, we can import the following completeness result (Ciardelli, 2009; Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011).\(^5\)

**Theorem 1** (Completeness theorem).

Let $\Phi$ be a set of sentences and $\psi$ a sentence, all in $L_P$. Then $\Phi$ entails $\psi$ in $\text{Inq}_A$ if and only if $\psi$ can be derived from $\Phi$ using *modus ponens* as the only inference rule, and the following axioms:

- All axioms for intuitionistic logic.
- Kreisel-Putnam: $(\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi \lor \chi) \rightarrow (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \psi) \lor (\neg \varphi \rightarrow \chi)$
- Atomic double negation: $\neg \neg p \rightarrow p$ (only for atomic $p$)

In the next two subsections we will introduce some additional notions, and highlight some specific features of $\text{Inq}_A$. In doing so, we will mostly restrict our attention to the propositional setting. Everything we will say also applies to the first order system, but formulating things in the first-order setting is a bit more cumbersome, because everything needs to be relativized to assignment functions.

3.6. **INFORMATIVENESS AND INQUISITIVENESS**

Recall that we defined the informative content of a proposition $A$, $\text{info}(A)$, as the union of all the possibilities in $A$. Derivatively, we

\(^4\) Groenendijk (2008) actually makes a distinction between the *meaning* of a sentence (the set of all supporting states) and the *proposition* expressed by a sentence (the set of maximal supporting states). Ciardelli (2008) makes a similar distinction. In other work on the support-based system, the meaning/proposition associated with a sentence is defined as the set of maximal supporting states.

\(^5\) The completeness problem for the first-order case is still open. See Ciardelli (2009) for discussion.
will say that the informative content of a sentence $\varphi$, $\text{info}(\varphi)$, is the informative content of the proposition that it expresses, i.e., $\bigcup [\varphi]$.

It can be shown that the informative content of a sentence $\varphi$ in $\text{Inq}_A$ always coincides with the proposition $[\varphi]_c$ expressed by that sentence in classical logic (see, e.g., Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011, p.62). This means that $\text{Inq}_A$ forms a conservative extension of classical logic, in the sense that it leaves the treatment of informative content untouched.

**Fact 8** (The treatment of informative content is classical).

For any sentence $\varphi$: $\text{info}(\varphi) = [\varphi]_c$.

We will say that a sentence is *informative* just in case its informative content does not cover the entire logical space, i.e., iff $\text{info}(\varphi) \neq W$. On the other hand we will say that $\varphi$ is *inquisitive* just in case accepting $\text{info}(\varphi)$ is not sufficient to settle $[\varphi]$, i.e., iff $\text{info}(\varphi) \notin [\varphi]$. In uttering an inquisitive sentence, a speaker does not just ask other participants to accept the information that she herself provides in uttering that sentence, but also to supply additional information.

**Definition 10** (Informative, inquisitive, and hybrid sentences).

- $\varphi$ is informative iff $\text{info}(\varphi) \neq W$
- $\varphi$ is inquisitive iff $\text{info}(\varphi) \notin [\varphi]$
- $\varphi$ is hybrid iff it is both informative and inquisitive

**Example 1** (Disjunction). $\text{Inq}_A$ crucially differs from classical logic in its treatment of disjunction. This is illustrated in figures (2a) and (2b). These figures assume a propositional language with just two atomic sentences, $p$ and $q$; world 11 makes both $p$ and $q$ true, world 10 makes $p$ true and $q$ false, etcetera. Figure (2a) depicts the classical meaning of $p \lor q$: the set of all worlds that make $p$ or $q$ true. Figure (2b) depicts the proposition expressed by $p \lor q$ in $\text{Inq}_A$. We have depicted only the maximal possibilities in $[p \lor q]$. Every sub-possibility of these possibilities is also in $[p \lor q]$. What is characteristic for all possibilities in $[p \lor q]$ is that they either consist only of worlds that make $p$ true, or only of worlds that make $q$ true. So in uttering $p \lor q$, a speaker provides the information that $p$ or $q$ holds, and at the same time she requests additional information from other participants in order to establish either that $p$ holds or that $q$ holds. Since $\text{info}(p \lor q)$ does not cover the entire logical space, $p \lor q$ is informative; and since $\text{info}(p \lor q) \notin [p \lor q]$, it is also inquisitive. So $p \lor q$ is an example of a hybrid sentence.
It can in fact be shown that disjunction is the only source of inquisitiveness in \( L_P \) (see, e.g., Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011, p.62).\(^6\)

**Fact 9** (Disjunction and inquisitiveness).
Any disjunction-free sentence in \( L_P \) is non-inquisitive.

It is interesting to note that in the framework of *alternative semantics* (Hamblin, 1973; Kratzer and Shimoyama, 2002) a treatment of disjunction and existential quantification as introducing sets of possibilities has also been proposed and widely adopted (Simons, 2005a, 2005b, Alonso-Ovalle, 2006, 2008, 2009, Aloni, 2007a, 2007b, Menéndez-Benito, 2005, 2010, among others). This treatment was motivated by a number of empirical phenomena, including free choice inferences, exclusivity implicatures, and conditionals with disjunctive antecedents. The new analysis of disjunction and indefinites made it possible to develop new accounts of these phenomena which improved considerably on previous accounts. However, no motivation has so far been provided for the alternative treatment of disjunction and indefinites independently of the linguistic phenomena at hand. In that sense, progress has certainly been made at the level of descriptive accuracy, but an explanation for why disjunction and indefinites would behave semantically the way they are assume to behave has not been provided so far. Moreover, the treatment of disjunction in alternative semantics has been presented as a real alternative for the classical treatment of disjunction as a *join* operator. Thus, anyone adopting the alternative treatment of disjunction is forced to entirely give up the classical account.

The algebraic inquisitive semantics developed in the present paper sheds new light on these two issues. First, it shows that, once inquisitive content is taken into consideration besides informative content, general algebraic considerations lead essentially to the treatment of disjunction that was proposed in alternative semantics, thus providing exactly the independent motivation that has so far been missing. Moreover, it shows that the ‘alternative’ treatment of disjunction is actually a natural generalization of the classical treatment: disjunction is still taken to behave semantically as a *join* operator, only now the propositions that this join operator applies to are more fine-grained in order to capture both informative and inquisitive content. So we can have our cake and eat it: we can adopt a treatment of disjunction as introducing sets of alternatives, and still characterize it as a *join* operator.

\(^6\) In \( L_{FO} \), existential quantification behaves very much like disjunction and is also a source of inquisitiveness.
Now let us return to the main storyline. We specified when sentences are informative and when they are inquisitive. In terms of these notions, it is natural to define questions, assertions, and tautologies as follows.

**Definition 11** (Questions, assertions, and tautologies).

- $\varphi$ is a question iff it is non-informative
- $\varphi$ is an assertion iff it is non-inquisitive
- $\varphi$ is a tautology iff it is neither informative nor inquisitive

**Fact 10** (Tautologies express the top element of the algebra).

- $\varphi$ is a tautology iff $[\varphi] = \top = \wp(W)$

Recall that in the classical setting, a sentence is a tautology just in case it is non-informative. In $\lnq_A$, sentences can be meaningful by being informative, but also by being inquisitive. Thus, it is natural that in order to count as a tautology in $\lnq_A$, a sentence has to be neither informative nor inquisitive.

### 3.7. Projection operators

We can think of sentences in $\lnq_A$ as inhabiting a two-dimensional space, as depicted in figure 3.7 (see also Mascarenhas, 2009, Ciardelli, 2009). One of the axes is inhabited by questions, which are always non-informative; the other axis is inhabited by assertions, which are always non-inquisitive; the ‘zero-point’ of the space is inhabited by tautologies, which are neither informative nor inquisitive; and the rest of the space is inhabited by hybrids, which are both informative and inquisitive.

Given this picture, it is natural to think of projection operators that map any sentence onto the axes of the space. In particular, we may consider a non-inquisitive projection operator $!$ that maps any sentence $\varphi$ to an assertion $!\varphi$ that is non-inquisitive but otherwise as similar as possible to $\varphi$, and a non-informative projection operator $?$. That maps
every $\varphi$ to a question $?\varphi$ that is non-informative but otherwise as similar as possible to $\varphi$.

We will add the operators $!$ and $? \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} ?$ to our logical language. In order to define their semantic contribution, let us formulate more precisely how we would like them to behave. First consider $!$, the non-inquisitive projection operator. We would like this operator to behave in such a way that for any $\varphi$:

1. $!\varphi$ is non-inquisitive;

2. $\text{info}(!\varphi) = \text{info}(\varphi)$, i.e., $!\varphi$ preserves the informative content of $\varphi$

The following ‘representation theorem’ shows that these requirements uniquely determine how $!$ should be defined.

**Theorem 2** (Representation theorem for non-inquisitive projection).

The non-inquisitive projection operator $!$ meets the above requirements if and only if it is defined as follows:

$$[!\varphi] := \varphi(\text{info}(\varphi))$$

**Proof.** First, we show that $!$, as defined here, satisfies the requirements. Notice that $\text{info}(!\varphi) = \bigcup[!\varphi] = \text{info}(\varphi)$. So the second requirement is fulfilled. And since $\text{info}(\varphi) \in [!\varphi]$, the first requirement is fulfilled as well.

7 In general, a representation theorem is a theorem that states that every abstract structure with certain properties must be isomorphic to some specific concrete structure. Our representation theorem states that in order to satisfy the above requirements, the non-inquisitive projection operator must be defined in a certain way.
Now let us show that any operator that meets the given requirements must behave exactly as \( ! \) does. Let \( \nabla \) be an operator that meets the given requirements. Then, for every \( \varphi \), \( \nabla \varphi \) must be non-inquisitive. That is, \( [\nabla \varphi] = \varphi(\text{info}(\nabla \varphi)) \). But we must also have that \( \text{info}(\nabla \varphi) = \text{info}(\varphi) \), which means that \( [\nabla \varphi] = \varphi(\text{info}(\varphi)) = ![\varphi] \). So \( \nabla \) must indeed behave exactly as \( ! \) does.

Now let us consider \(?\), the non-informative projection operator. Clearly, we always want \(?\varphi\) to be non-informative. But what else do we want? We cannot demand that \(?\varphi\) is always just as inquisitive as \( \varphi \) itself, i.e. that \([!?\varphi]\) and \([\varphi]\) are always settled by exactly the same pieces of information. After all, if we enforced this requirement, \( ?\varphi \) would simply have to be equivalent to \( \varphi \). There is, however, a natural way to weaken this requirement. In order to do so, we should not only consider the pieces of information that settle \([\varphi]\), but rather more generally the pieces of information that decide on \([\varphi]\).

**Definition 12** (Contradicting and deciding on a proposition). Let \( \beta \) be a piece of information, and \([\varphi]\) a proposition. Then:

- \( \beta \) contradicts \([\varphi]\) iff \( \beta \cap \bigcup[\varphi] = \emptyset \)
- \( \beta \) decides on \([\varphi]\) iff it settles \([\varphi]\) or contradicts \([\varphi]\)
- \( \text{D}(\varphi) \) denotes the set of all pieces of information that decide on \([\varphi]\)

Now we are ready to formulate the requirements for \(?\). Namely, we want \(?\) to behave in such a way that for every \( \varphi \):

1. \( ?\varphi \) is non-informative
2. \( \text{D}(?\varphi) = \text{D}(\varphi) \)

Again, these requirements uniquely determine how \(?\) should be defined.

**Theorem 3** (Representation theorem for non-informative projection). The non-informative projection operator satisfies the above requirements if and only if it is defined as follows:

\[
[?\varphi] := \text{D}(\varphi)
\]

That is, \([?\varphi]\) consists of all possibilities that decide on \([\varphi]\).

**Proof.** First let us check that, given this definition, \(?\) satisfies the given requirements. First, we always have that \( \bigcup[?\varphi] = W \), which means that \(?\varphi\) is never informative. Moreover, if \( \beta \) is a piece of information that decides on \([\varphi]\) then it clearly settles, and therefore decides on \([?\varphi]\).
Vice versa, if $\beta$ decides on $[?\varphi]$ then, since there are no possibilities that are disjoint from $\bigcup [?\varphi]$, $\beta$ must actually settle $[?\varphi]$ and therefore be included in $[?\varphi]$. And this means, given how $[?\varphi]$ is defined, that $\beta$ must decide on $[\varphi]$. So $?$ indeed meets the given requirements.

Now let us show that any operator that satisfies the given requirements must behave exactly as $?$ does. Let $\Delta$ be an operator that satisfies the requirements. Then, for every $\varphi$, $\Delta \varphi$ must be non-informative, which means that $\text{info}(\Delta \varphi) = W$. Moreover, we must have that $D(\Delta \varphi) = D(\varphi)$. Given that $\text{info}(\Delta \varphi) = W$, there cannot be any possibilities that are disjoint from $\bigcup [\Delta \varphi]$. Thus, $D(\Delta \varphi)$ amounts to $[\Delta \varphi]$. But then $[\Delta \varphi]$ must be identical to $D(\varphi)$, which is $[?\varphi]$. So $\Delta$ must indeed behave exactly as $?$ does.

Now, if $[!\varphi]$ is defined as $\wp(\text{info}(\varphi))$, and $[?\varphi]$ as $D(\varphi)$, then the semantic behavior of these operators can actually be characterized in terms of our basic algebraic operations.

**Fact 11** (Projection in terms of basic algebraic operations).

- $[!\varphi] = ([\varphi]^*)^*$
- $[?\varphi] = [\varphi] \cup [\varphi]^*$

This also means that the projection operators can actually be expressed in terms of the basic connectives in our logical language.\(^8\)

**Fact 12** (Projection operators in terms of basic connectives).

- $!\varphi \equiv \neg\neg \varphi$
- $?\varphi \equiv \varphi \lor \neg \varphi$

Thus, rather than adding $!$ and $?$ as primitive logical constants to our language, we can simply introduce $!\varphi$ as an abbreviation of $\neg\neg \varphi$ and $?\varphi$ as an abbreviation of $\varphi \lor \neg \varphi$. The logic that the system gives rise to is then fully determined by the behavior of our basic connectives, and in proving things about the system, we never need to consider $!$ and $?$ explicitly.

This is in fact exactly how $!\varphi$ and $?\varphi$ were defined in (Ciardelli, 2009; Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009; Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011), i.e., as abbreviations of $\neg\neg \varphi$ and $\varphi \lor \neg \varphi$. So again, our considerations in this section have not really led to a new treatment of projection operators, but rather to a more solid foundation for the existing treatment.\(^9\)

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\(^8\) We use $\equiv$ here to denote equivalence, i.e., $\varphi \equiv \psi$ iff $[\varphi] = [\psi]$.

\(^9\) Our considerations here can also be seen as providing motivation for the existential closure operator in alternative semantics (see the references given above), which behaves essentially in the same way as our non-inquisitive projection operator.
Having established the connection between our characterization of the projection operators and the way they were defined in earlier work, we can immediately import a number of results. We mention here only the two most significant ones. First, there is a close correspondence between the projection operators and the semantic categories of questions and assertions.

**Fact 13** (Projection operators and semantic categories).

- \( \varphi \) is an assertion iff \( \varphi \equiv !\varphi \)
- \( \varphi \) is a question iff \( \varphi \equiv ?\varphi \)

Second, a sentence \( \varphi \) is always equivalent to the conjunction of its two projections, \(?\varphi\) and \(!\varphi\).

**Fact 14** (Division). \( \varphi \equiv ?\varphi \land !\varphi \)

The results obtained in this section are summarized visually in figure 3.7. Every hybrid sentence \( \varphi \) has a projection onto the horizontal axis, \( !\varphi \), and a projection onto the vertical axis, \( ?\varphi \). The former is always an assertion, the latter is always a question, and the conjunction of the two is always equivalent to \( \varphi \) itself.

Finally, we would like to suggest that these results may be significant for the semantic analysis of declarative and interrogative complements in natural language. Just as it is to be expected that natural languages generally have connectives that behave semantically as *join*, *meet*, and *pseudo-complement* operators, it is also to be expected that natural languages generally have complementizers that behave seman-
tically as non-informative or non-inquisitive projection operators, or combinations thereof.\textsuperscript{10}

It is interesting to note in this regard that the non-informative projection operator, $?$, which turns every sentence in our logical language into a question and would therefore naturally be associated with interrogative complementizers in natural languages, is closely related to disjunction and existential quantification. Namely, $[\lnot \varphi]$ is the join of $[\varphi]$ and $[\varphi]^*$, and the join operation, also associated with disjunction and existential quantification, is the essential source of inquisiteness in $\text{Inq}_A$. This fact may provide the basis for an explanation of the well-known observation that in many languages, question words are homophonous with words for disjunction and/or indefinites (e.g., Japanese ka) (see Jayaseelan, 2001, 2008, Bhat, 2005, Haida, 2007, AnderBois, 2011, among others).

3.8. Maximal possibilities and compliance

Before concluding, we would like to briefly come back to the difference between the notion of a proposition in $\text{Inq}_A$ and the one assumed in most previous work on the support-based system (see footnote 4).

As mentioned, the proposition expressed by a sentence $\varphi$ in $\text{Inq}_A$ coincides precisely with the set of all states that support $\varphi$. However, in the support-based system, the proposition expressed by $\varphi$ is usually defined as the set of maximal states supporting $\varphi$, i.e., the set of states that support $\varphi$ and are not contained in any other state supporting $\varphi$. We will use $[[\varphi]]$ to denote this set of maximal supporting states.

\textsuperscript{10}In English, declarative and interrogative complementizers are realized in embedded clauses by the words that and whether. Even though these words do not occur in unembedded clauses, it is commonly assumed that the syntactic representations of unembedded clauses also involve complementizers. This assumption is also commonly made for $wh$-interrogatives, which, in English, do not exhibit overt complementizers even if they are embedded. In many other languages, complementizers are realized more overtly. It seems plausible to treat the declarative complementizer in English (that) as $!$, the $wh$-interrogative complementizer as $?$, and the polar interrogative complementizer (whether) as $?!$. A detailed examination of this linguistic analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Importantly, however, note that the framework developed here also allows us to formulate alternative analyses. As emphasized at the outset, and hopefully clarified by the approach taken here, the framework as such does not make any direct predictions about the semantic behavior of any specific constructions in any specific language. It mainly offers the logical tools that are necessary to formulate such analyses, and gives rise to the expectation that, in general, natural languages will have ways to express the basic algebraic operations and the basic projection operations on propositions.
Now, if we restrict our attention to $L_P$, it can in fact be shown that a sentence $\varphi$ is supported by a state $s$ if and only if $s$ is contained in a maximal state supporting $\varphi$ (see Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2011, p.59).

**Fact 15** (Support and maximal supporting states for $L_P$).

For any sentence $\varphi \in L_P$ and any state $s$:

$$s \models \varphi \iff s \subseteq \alpha \text{ for some } \alpha \in [\varphi]$$

This means that, for any $\varphi \in L_P$, $[\varphi]$ can be fully recovered from $[[\varphi]]$, simply by taking its downward closure. Clearly, $[[\varphi]]$ can also always be obtained from $[\varphi]$, by taking maximal elements. So at first sight there does not seem to be any reason to prefer one notion over the other.

However, there is a specific reason why $[[\varphi]]$ is usually adopted in the support-based system, rather than $[\varphi]$. Namely, one of the main logical notions that the semantics is intended to give rise to, i.e., the notion of *compliance*, makes crucial reference to maximal supporting states and is therefore more straightforwardly characterized in terms of $[[\varphi]]$ than in terms of $[\varphi]$. Compliance is a strict notion of logical relatedness. For instance, $p$ is taken to be a compliant response to $?p$, but $p \land q$ is not, because $q$ contributes information that is logically unrelated to $?p$. Maximal supporting states play an important role in characterizing compliance because they correspond to pieces of information that are *just* sufficient to settle the given proposition, i.e., they settle the proposition without providing additional, possibly redundant and logically unrelated information (see Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2009).

Thus, if we want to characterize such a notion of compliance, there indeed seems to be a good reason to focus on maximal supporting states, and in the propositional setting this is unproblematic (although taking the proposition expressed by a sentence to consist of all supporting states, as in $\text{Inq}_A$, does of course not prevent us from characterizing compliance, it just makes it slightly less straightforward).

However, it has been shown in great detail by Ciardelli (2009, 2010) that if we move to the first-order setting, compliance can no longer be defined in terms of maximal supporting states; in fact, in the first-order setting compliance cannot be defined in terms of support at all. Ciardelli’s argument starts with the following example.

**Example 2** (The boundedness sentence). Consider a first-order language which has a unary predicate symbol $P$, a binary function symbol $+$, and the set $\mathbb{N}$ of natural numbers as its individual constants. Suppose that our logical space consist of first-order models $M = \langle D, I \rangle$, where $D = \mathbb{N}$, $I$ maps every $n \in \mathbb{N}$ to itself, and $+$ is interpreted as addition. So the only difference between the models in our logical space is the
way in which they interpret $P$. Let $x \leq y$ abbreviate $\exists z (x + z = y)$, let $B(x)$ abbreviate $\forall y (P(y) \rightarrow y \leq x)$, and for every $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let $B(n)$ abbreviate $\forall y (P(y) \rightarrow y \leq n)$. Intuitively, $B(n)$ says that $n$ is greater than or equal to any number in $P$. In other words, $B(n)$ says that $n$ is an upper bound for $P$.

A state $s$ supports a formula $B(n)$, for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$, if $B(n)$ is true in every model in $s$, that is, if $n$ is an upper bound for $P$ in every $M$ in $s$. Now consider the formula $\exists x. B(x)$, which intuitively says that there is an upper bound for $P$. This formula, which Ciardelli refers to as the boundedness sentence, does not have a maximal supporting state. To see this, let $s$ be an arbitrary state supporting $\exists x. B(x)$. Then there must be a number $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $s$ supports $B(n)$, i.e., $B(n)$ must be true in all models in $s$. Now let $M'$ be the model in which $P$ denotes the singleton set $\{n + 1\}$. Then $M'$ cannot be in $s$, because it does not make $B(n)$ true. Thus, the state $s'$ which is obtained from $s$ by adding $M'$ to it is a proper superset of $s$ itself. However, $s'$ clearly supports $B(n + 1)$, and therefore also still supports $\exists x. B(x)$. This shows that any state supporting $\exists x. B(x)$ can be extended to a larger state which still supports $\exists x. B(x)$, and therefore no state supporting $\exists x. B(x)$ can be maximal.

This example shows that a general notion of compliance, that applies both in the propositional setting and in the first-order setting, should not make reference to maximal supporting states. Such a notion would give undesirable results for the boundedness sentence and other cases where there are no maximal supporting states. Intuitively, this is because in these cases there are no pieces of information that provide exactly enough information to settle the given proposition. For every piece of information that settles the proposition, we can find a weaker piece of information that still settles the proposition. This means that maximal supporting states do not form a suitable basis for a general notion of compliance.

Ciardelli goes on to argue that a satisfactory notion of compliance can in fact not be defined in terms of support at all. This argument is based on the following example.

**Example 3** (The positive boundedness sentence). Consider the following variant of the boundedness sentence: $\exists x (x \neq 0 \land B(x))$. This formula says that there is a positive upper bound for $P$. Intuitively, it differs from the ordinary boundedness sentence in that it does not license “Yes, zero is an upper bound for $P$” as a compliant response. However, in terms of support, $\exists x (x \neq 0 \land B(x))$ and $\exists x. B(x)$ are entirely equivalent. Thus, support is not fine-grained enough to capture the intuition that these formulas do not license the same range of compliant responses. □
This argument is relevant here, because it brings to light an important limitation of the support-based system, and therefore also of InqA. The system does what it was meant to do, i.e., it provides a notion of meaning that embodies both informative and inquisitive content in a satisfactory way (also in the case of the boundedness sentences). However, this notion of meaning is not fine-grained enough to provide the basis for an adequate notion of compliance.

Several attempts have been made over the past three years to overcome this limitation (see, e.g., Ciardelli, 2009, 2010, Groenendijk and Roelofsen, 2011). However, none of these attempts have so far been entirely conclusive. It is hoped that the algebraic approach developed here will shed new light on this issue as well. In principle, we could start out with a notion of meaning that is even richer than the one adopted here. Once we have a clear intuitive understanding of such a notion of meaning, and a suitable notion of entailment, we can exercise essentially the same line of thought that has been pursued here, and hopefully arrive at a system that adequately deals with compliance and other aspects of meaning that are beyond the reach of InqA.

4. Conclusion

In this paper we developed and investigated an algebraic inquisitive semantics, InqA. We proposed to define propositions as non-empty, downward closed sets of possibilities, and we showed that entailment can simply be defined as inclusion in this case, suitably capturing when one proposition is at least as informative and inquisitive as another. We showed that this entailment order gives rise to a complete Heyting algebra, with meet, join, and relative pseudo-complement operators. Just as in classical logic, these semantic operators were then associated with the logical constants in a first-order language.

We found that InqA essentially coincides with the support-based system developed and investigated in much previous work on inquisitive semantics. Thus, our algebraic considerations did not lead to a wholly new semantics, but rather to a more solid foundation for the most basic existing system. In future work, we hope to extend the approach to obtain more fine-grained systems, where propositions do not only embody informative and inquisitive content, but also further aspects of meaning.
References


